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ABSTRACT
We consider the problem of extracting safe environments and con-
trollers for reach-avoid objectives for systems with known state and
control spaces, but unknown dynamics. In a given environment, a
common approach is to synthesize a controller from an abstraction
or a model of the system (potentially learned from data). However,
in many situations, the relationship between the dynamics of the
model and the actual system is not known; and hence it is diffi-
cult to provide safety guarantees for the system. In such cases, the
Standard Simulation Metric (SSM), defined as the worst-case norm
distance between the model and the system output trajectories, can
be used to modify a reach-avoid specification for the system into
a more stringent specification for the abstraction. Nevertheless,
the obtained distance, and hence the modified specification, can be
quite conservative. This limits the set of environments for which a
safe controller can be obtained. We propose SPEC, a specification-
centric simulation metric, which overcomes these limitations by
computing the distance using only the trajectories that violate the
specification for the system. We show that modifying a reach-avoid
specification with SPEC allows us to synthesize a safe controller for
a larger set of environments compared to SSM. We also propose a
probabilistic method to compute SPEC for a general class of systems.
Case studies using simulators for quadrotors and autonomous cars
illustrate the advantages of the proposed metric for determining
safe environment sets and controllers.
KEYWORDS
Simulation metric, Safe environment assumptions, Safe controller
synthesis, Model-mismatch, Reach-avoid objectives, Scenario opti-
mization.
1 INTRODUCTION
Recent research in robotics and control theory has focused on devel-
oping complex autonomous systems, such as robotic manipulators,
∗Both authors contributed equally to this research.
** All authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Sci-
ences, University of California, Berkeley.
** This research is supported in part by NSF under the CPS Frontier project VeHICaL
project (1545126), by NSF grants 1739816 and 1837132, by the UC-Philippine-California
Advanced Research Institute under project IIID-2016-005, by the Army Research Labo-
ratory and was accomplished under Cooperative Agreement Number W911NF-17-2-
0196, by the DARPA BRASS program under agreement number FA8750-16-C0043, the
DARPA Assured Autonomy program under agreement number FA8750-18-C-0101, the
iCyPhy center, and by Berkeley Deep Drive.
HSCC’19, April 2019, Montreal, Canada
.
autonomous vehicles, and surgical robots. Since many of these
systems are safety-critical, it is important to design provably-safe
controllers while determining environments in which safety can
be guaranteed. In this work, we focus on reach-avoid objectives,
where the goal is to design a controller to reach a target set of states
(referred to as reach set) while avoiding unsafe states (avoid set).
Reach-avoid problems are common for autonomous vehicles in the
real world; for example, a drone flying in an indoor setting. Here
the reach set could be a desired goal position and the avoid set
could be the set of the obstacles. In such a setting, it is important to
determine the environments in which the drone can safely navigate,
as well as the corresponding safe controllers.
Typically, a mathematical model of the system, such as a physics-
based first principlesmodel, is used for synthesizing a safe controller
in different environments (e.g., [36, 37]). However, when the system
dynamics are unknown, synthesizing such a controller becomes
challenging. In such cases, it is a common practice to identify a
model for the system. This model represents an abstraction of the
system behavior. Recently, there has been an increased interest in
using machine learning (ML) based tools, such as neural networks
and Gaussian processes, for learning abstractions directly from the
data collected on the system [5, 6, 28]. One of the many verification
challenges for ML-based systems [34] is that such abstractions
cannot be directly used for verification, since it is not clear a priori
how representative the abstraction is of the actual system. Hence,
to use the abstraction to provide guarantees for the system, we
need to first quantify the differences between it and the system.
One approach is to use model identification techniques that
provide bounds on the mismatch between the dynamics of the
system and its abstraction both in time and frequency domains
(see [17, 23, 29] and references therein). This bound is then used
to design a provably stabilizing controller for the system. These
approaches have largely been limited to linear abstractions and sys-
tems, and the focus has been on designing asymptotically stabilizing
controllers.
Another way to quantify the difference between a general non-
linear system and its abstraction relies on the notion of a (approx-
imate) simulation metric [3, 4, 19]. Such a metric measures the
maximal distance between the system and the abstraction output
trajectories over all finite horizon control sequences. Standard sim-
ulation metrics (referred to as SSM here on) have been used for a va-
riety of purposes such as safety verification [20], abstraction design
for discrete [27], nonlinear [33], switched [21] systems, piecewise
deterministic and labelled Markov processes [14, 35], and stochastic
hybrid systems [2, 7, 16, 24], model checking [4, 25], and model
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Figure 1. The avoid set is expanded and the reach set is contracted with the
simulation metric da . If the abstraction trajectory (ξM ) stays clear of the ex-
panded avoid set and reaches the contracted reach set, the system trajectory
(ξS ) also stays clear of the original avoid set and reaches the original reach
set.
reduction [12, 32]. Once computed, the SSM is used to expand the
unsafe set (or avoid set) in [2]. For reach-avoid scenarios, we addi-
tionally use it to contract the reach set as shown in Figure 1. If we
can synthesize a safe controller that ensures the abstraction trajec-
tory avoids the expanded avoid set and reaches the contracted reach
set, then the system trajectory is guaranteed to avoid and reach the
original avoid set and reach set respectively. This follows from the
property that SSM captures the worst case distance between the
trajectories of the system and the abstraction. Consequently, the
set of safe environments for the system can be obtained by finding
the set of environments for which we can design a safe controller
for the abstraction with the modified specification.
Even though powerful in its approach, SSM computes the maxi-
mal distance between the system and the abstraction trajectories
across all possible controllers. We show in this paper that this is
unnecessary and might lead to a conservative bound on the qual-
ity of the abstraction for the purposes of controller synthesis. In
particular, the larger the distance between the system and the ab-
straction, the larger the expansion (contraction) of the avoid (reach)
set. In many cases, this results in unrealizability wherein there
does not exist a safe controller for the abstraction for the modified
specification.
In this paper, we propose SPEC, SPEcification-Centric simulation
metric, that overcomes these limitations. SPEC achieves this by
computing the distance across
(1) only those controllers that can be synthesized by a particular
control scheme and that are safe for the abstraction (in the
context of the original reach-avoid specification) — these are
the only potential safe controllers for the system;
(2) only those abstraction and system trajectories for which the
system violates the reach-avoid specification, and
(3) only between the abstraction trajectory and the reach and
the avoid sets.
If the reach-avoid specification is changed using SPEC in a similar
fashion as that for SSM, it is guaranteed that if a controller is
safe for the abstract model, it remains safe for the system. SPEC
can be significantly less conservative than SSM, and can be used
to design safe controllers for the system for a broader range of
reach-avoid specifications. In fact, we show that, among all uniform
distance bounds (i.e., a single distance bound is used to modify the
specification in all environments), SPEC provides the largest set of
environments such that a safe controller for the abstraction is also
safe for the system.
Note that a similar metric has been used earlier [18] to find
tight environment assumptions for temporal logic specifications.
However, it applies in much more restricted settings since it relies
on having simple linear representations of the abstraction which
can be expressed as a linear optimization problem.
In general, it is challenging to compute both SSM and SPECwhen
the dynamics of the system are not available. Several approaches
have been proposed in the literature for computing SSM [1, 19, 24];
however, restrictive assumptions on the dynamics of the systems
are often required to compute it. More recently, a randomized ap-
proach has been proposed to compute SSM [2, 16] for finite-horizon
properties that relies on “scenario optimization”, which was first in-
troduced for solving robust convex programs via randomization [8]
and then extended to semi-infinite chance-constrained optimization
problems [10]. Scenario optimization is a sampling-based method
to solve semi-infinite optimization problems, and has been used
for system and control design [9, 11]. In this work, we propose a
scenario optimization-based computational method for SPEC that
has general applicability and is not restricted to a specific class of
systems. Indeed, the only assumption is that the system is available
as an oracle, with known state and control spaces, which we can
simulate to determine the corresponding output trajectory. Given
that the distance metric is obtained via randomization and, hence,
is a random quantity, we provide probabilistic guarantees on the
performance of SPEC. However, this confidence is a design param-
eter and can be chosen as close to 1 as desired (within a simulation
budget). To summarize, this paper’s main contributions are:
• SPEC, a new simulation metric that is less conservative than
SSM, and provides the largest set of environments such that a
safe controller for the abstraction is also safe for the system;
• a method to compute SPEC that is not restricted to a specific
class of systems, and
• a demonstration of the proposed approach on numerical
examples and simulations of real-world autonomous systems,
such as a quadrotor and an autonomous car.
2 MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
Let S be an unknown, discrete-time, potentially non-linear, dynam-
ical system with state space Rnx and control space Rnu . LetM be
an abstraction of S with the same state and control spaces as S,
whose dynamics are known. We also assume that the bounds be-
tween the dynamics ofM and S are not available beforehand (i.e.,
we cannot a priori quantify how different the two are). ξS(t ;x0, u)
denotes the trajectory ofS at time t starting from the initial state x0
and applying the controller u. ξM is similarly defined. For ease of
notation, we drop u and x0 from the trajectory arguments wherever
convenient.
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We define by E := X0×A×R the set of all reach-avoid scenarios
(also referred to as environment scenarios here on), for which we
want to synthesize a controller for S. A reach-avoid scenario e ∈
E is a three-tuple, (x0,A(·),R(·)), where x0 ∈ X0 ⊂ Rnx is the
initial state of S. A(·) ∈ A,A(·) ⊂ Rnx and R(·) ∈ R,R(·) ⊂ Rnx
are (potentially time varying) sequences of avoid and reach sets
respectively. We leave A and R abstract except where necessary.
If the sets are not time varying, we can replace R(·) (respectively
A(·)) by the stationary R (respectively A). Similarly, if there is no
avoid or reach set at a particular time, we can represent A(t) = ∅
and R(t) = Rnx .
For each e ∈ E, we define a reach-avoid specification, φ(e)
φ(e) := {ξ (·) : ∀t ∈ T ξ (t) < A(t) ∧ ξ (t) ∈ R(t)}, (1)
where T denote the time-horizon {0, 1, . . . ,H }. We say ξ (·) satisfies
the specification φ(e), denoted ξ (·) |= φ(e), if ξ (·) ∈ φ(e).
The reader might observe that our use of R(·) in (1) differs some-
what from the intuitive notion of a reach set (depicted, e.g., in Fig. 1).
Specifically, (1) defines the reach-avoid specification such that the
output trajectory must remain within R(t) at all times t , while the
usual notion involves eventually reaching a desired set of states.
Note, however, that for the purposes of defining φ(e), these notions
are equivalent if R(t) in (1) represents the backwards reachable tube
corresponding to the desired reach set: if a state is reachable eventu-
ally, then the trajectory stays within the backwards reachable tube
at all time points. We henceforth use the R(t) in the latter sense
since it simplifies the mathematics in the paper.
Finally, we defineUΠ(e) ⊂ U to be the space of all permissible
controllers for e , andU to be the space of all finite horizon control
sequences over T . For example, if we restrict ourselves to linear
feedback controllers,UΠ represents the set of all linear feedback
controllers that are defined over the time horizon T .
3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
Given the set of reach-avoid scenarios E, the controller scheme
UΠ , and the abstractionM, our goal is two-fold:
(1) to find the environment scenarios for which it is possible to
design a controller such that ξS(·) satisfies the corresponding
reach-avoid specification φ(e),
(2) to find a corresponding safe controller for each scenario in
(1).
Mathematically, we are interested in computing the set ES
ES = {e ∈ E : ∃u ∈ UΠ(e) , ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e)}, (2)
and the corresponding set of safe controllersUS(e) for each e ∈ ES
US(e) = {u ∈ UΠ(e) : ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e)}. (3)
When a dynamics model of S is known, several methods have been
studied in literature to compute the sets ES andUS(e) for reach-
avoid problems [31, 37, 38]. However, since a dynamics model of S
is unknown, the computation of these sets is challenging in general.
To overcome this problem, one generally relies on the abstraction
M. We make the following assumptions on S andM:
Assumption 1. S is available as an oracle that can be simulated,
i.e., we can run an execution (or experiment) on S and obtain the
corresponding system trajectory ξS(·).
Assumption 2. For any e ∈ E, we can determine if there exist a
controller such that ξM |= φ(e) and can compute such a controller.
Assumption 1 states that even though we do not know the dy-
namics of S, we can run an execution of S. Assumption 2 states
that it is possible to verify whetherM satisfies a given specification
φ(e) or not. Although it is not a straightforward problem, since the
dynamics ofM are known, several existing methods can be used
for obtaining a safe controller forM.
Under these assumptions, we show that we can convert a verifi-
cation problem on S to a verification problem onM. In particular,
we compute a distance bound, SPEC, between S and M which
along withM allows us to compute a conservative approximation
of ES andUS(e).
4 RUNNING EXAMPLE
We now introduce a very simple example that we will use to il-
lustrate our approach, a 2 state linear system in which the system
and the abstraction differ only in one parameter. Although simple,
this example illustrates several facets of SPEC. We present more
realistic case studies in Section 8.
Consider a system S whose dynamics are given as
x(t + 1) =
[
x1(t + 1)
x2(t + 1)
]
=
[
2 0
0 0.1
] [
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
+
[
1
0
]
u(t). (4)
We are interested in designing a controller for S to regulate it from
the initial state x(0) := x0 = [0, 0] to a desired state x∗ =
[
x∗1 , 0
]
over a time-horizon of 20 steps, i.e, H = 20. In particular, we have
X0 = {[0, 0]}, A = ∅, R =
⋃
−4≤x ∗1 ≤4
R(·;x∗),
where
R(t ;x∗) =R2, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,H − 1},
R(H ;x∗) ={x : ∥x − x∗∥2 < γ }.
We use γ = 0.5 in our simulations. Thus, each e ∈ E consists of a
final state x∗ (equivalently, a reach set R(H ;x∗)) to which we want
the system to regulate, starting from the origin. Consequently, the
system trajectory satisfies the reach-avoid specification in this case
if ξS(H ;x0, u) ∈ R(H ;x∗).
For the purpose of this example, we assume that the system
dynamics in (4) are unknown; only the dynamics of its abstraction
M are known and given as
x(t + 1) =
[
x1(t + 1)
x2(t + 1)
]
=
[
2 0
0 0.1
] [
x1(t)
x2(t)
]
+
[
1
0.1
]
u(t). (5)
In this example, we use the class of linear feedback controllers
asUΠ(e), although other control schemes can very well be used.
In particular, for any given environmental scenario e , the space of
controllersUΠ(e) is given by
UΠ(e) = {LQR(q,x∗) : 0.1 ≤ q ≤ 100},
where LQR(q,x∗) is a Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) designed
for the abstraction dynamics in (5) to regulate the abstraction tra-
jectory to x∗ 1, with the state penalty matrixQ = qI and the control
penalty coefficient R = 1. Here, I ∈ R2×2 is an identity matrix.
1That is, we penalize the trajectory deviation to the desired state x ∗ in the LQR cost
function.
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Thus, for different values of q we get different controllers, which
affect the various characteristics of the resultant trajectory, such as
overshoot, undershoot, and final state. LQR(q) for any given q can
be obtained by solving the discrete-time Riccati equation [26]. Our
goal thus is to use the dynamics in (5) to find the set of final states
to which S can be regulated and the corresponding regulator in
UΠ(e).
5 SOLUTION APPROACH
5.1 Computing approximate safe sets usingM
and simulation metric
Computing sets ES andUS exactly can be challenging since the
dynamics of S are unknown a priori. Generally, we use the ab-
stractionM as a replacement for S to synthesize and analyze safe
controllers for S. However, to provide guarantees on S usingM,
we would need to quantify how different the two are.
We quantify this difference through a distance bound,d , between
S and M. d is used to modify the specification φ(e) to a more
stringent specification φ(e;d) such that if ξM (·) |= φ(e;d) then
ξS(·) |= φ(e). Thus, the set of safe controllers forM for φ(e ;d) can
be used as an approximation forUS(e). In particular, if we define
the setsUφ(e ;d ) and Eφ (d) as
Uφ(e ;d ) := {u ∈ UΠ(e) : ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e;d)}
Eφ (d) := {e ∈ E : Uφ(e,d ) , ∅},
(6)
thenUφ(e ;d ) and Eφ (d) can be used as an approximation ofUS(e)
and ES respectively. Consequently, a verification problem onS can
be converted into a verification problem onM using the modified
specification.
One such distance bound d is given by the simulation metric,
SSM, betweenM and S defined as
da = max
e ∈E
max
u∈UΠ(e)
∥ξS(·;x0, u) − ξM (·;x0, u)∥∞ (7)
Here, the ∞-norm is the maximum distance between the trajec-
tories across all timesteps. Typically SSM is computed over the
space of all finite horizon controlsU instead ofUΠ(e) [20]. Since
we are interested in a given control scheme, we restrict this com-
putation toUΠ(e). In general, da is difficult to compute, because
it requires searching over (the potentially infinite) space of con-
trollers and environments. An approximate technique to compute
da was presented for systems whose dynamics were unknown with
probabilistic guarantees in [2].
However, if da can be computed then it can be used to modify a
specification φ(e) to φ(e ;da ) as follows: “expand” the avoid set A(·)
to get the augmented avoid set A(·;da ) = A(·) ⊕ da , and “contract”
the reach set R(·) to obtain a conservative reach set R(·;da ) = R(·)⊖
da (see Figure 1). Here, ⊕ (⊖) is the Minkowski sum(difference)2.
Consequently, φ(e ;da ) is the set of trajectories which avoidA(·;da )
and are always contained in R(·;da ),
φ(e;da ) := {ξ (·) : ξ (t) < A(t ;da ), ξ (t) ∈ R(t ;da )∀t ∈ T }. (8)
Then it can be shown that any controller that satisfies the specifi-
cation φ(e ;da ) forM also ensures that S satisfies the specification
φ(e).
2The Minkowski sum of a set K and a scalar d is the set of all points that are the sum
of any point in K and B(d ), where B(d ) is a disc of radius d around the origin.
Proposition 1. For any e ∈ E and controller u ∈ UΠ(e), we have
ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e;da ) implies ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e).
The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix. Proposi-
tion 1 implies that Eφ (da ) andUφ(e ;da ) can be used as approxima-
tions of ES andUS(e) respectively. However, the distance bound
in (7) does not take into account the reach-avoid specification (en-
vironment) for which a controller needs to be synthesized. Thus,
da can be quite conservative. As a result, the modified specification
can be so stringent that the set of environments Eφ (da ) for which
we can synthesize a provably safe controller for the abstraction
(and hence for the system) itself will be very small, resulting in a
very conservative approximation of ES .
5.2 Specification-Centric Simulation Metric
(SPEC)
To overcome these limitations, we propose SPEC,
db = max
e ∈E
max
u ∈Uφ (e )
d(ξS(·), ξM (·)), (9)
where
d(ξS(·), ξM (·)) = mint ∈T(min{h
(
ξM (t ;x0, u),A(t)
)
,
− h (ξM (t ;x0, u),R(t))})1(ξS (·)̸ |=φ(e))
(10)
HereUφ(e) := {u ∈ UΠ(e) : ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e)} is the set of all
controls such thatM satisfies the specification φ(e). 1l represents
the indicator function which is 1 if l is true and 0 otherwise, h(x ,K)
is the signed distance function defined as
h(x ,K) :=
{
infk ∈K ∥x − k ∥, if x < K
− infk ∈KC ∥x − k ∥, otherwise.
If for any e ∈ E,Uφ(e) is empty, we define the distance function
d(ξS(·), ξM (·)) to be zero. Similarly, if there is no A(·) or R(·) at a
particular t , the corresponding signed distance function is defined
to be∞. There are four major differences between (7) and (9):
(1) To compute the db we only consider the feasible set of
controllers that can be synthesized by the control policy,
Uφ(e) ⊆ UΠ(e), as all other controllers do not help us in
synthesizing a safe controller for S (as they are not even
safe forM).
(2) To compute the distance betweenS andM, we only consider
those trajectories where S violates the specification. This is
because a non-zero distance between the trajectories of S
andM, where the ξS |= φ(e) does not give us any additional
information in synthesizing a safe controller.
(3) Within a falsifying ξS , we compute the minimum distance
of the abstraction trajectory from the avoid and reach sets
rather than the system trajectory, as that is sufficient to
obtain a margin to discard behaviors that are safe for the
abstraction but unsafe for the system.
(4) Finally, a minimum over time of this distance is sufficient to
discard an unsafe trajectory, as the trajectory will be unsafe
if it is unsafe at any t .
These considerations ensure that db is far less conservative com-
pared to da and allows us to synthesize a safe controller for the
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system for a wider set of environments. We first prove that db can
be used to compute an approximation of ES .
Proposition 2. If Uφ(e ;db ) ⊆ Uφ(e), then ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e ;db )
implies ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e) ∀e ∈ E, u ∈ UΠ(e).
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in the Appendix. Thus,
if we define Uφ(e ;db ) and Eφ (db ) as in (6) then they can be used
as approximations of US(e) and ES respectively. Proposition 2
requires that the set of controllers that satisfy the modified specifi-
cation,Uφ(e ;db ), is a subset of the set of the controllers that satisfy
the actual specification,Uφ(e). WhenUΠ(e) = U, this condition
is trivially satisfied as the modified specification is more stringent
than the actual specification. Other control schemes, such as the
set of linear feedback controllers and feasibility-based optimization
schemes also satisfy this condition. In fact, in such cases, the pro-
posed metric, db , quantifies the tightest (largest) approximation of
ES , i.e., ∄d < db , such that Eφ (d) ⊆ ES .
Theorem 1. LetUΠ be such thatUφ(e ;d1) ⊆ Uφ(e ;d2) whenever
d1 > d2. Let d ∈ R+ be any distance bound such that
∀e ∈ E ,∀u ∈ UΠ(e) , ξM (·) |= φ(e;d) → ξS(·) |= φ(e). (11)
Then ∀e ∈ E,Uφ(e ;d ) ⊆ Uφ(e ;db ) ⊆ US(e). Moreover, Eφ (d) ⊆
Eφ (db ) ⊆ ES . Hence, Eφ (db ) and Uφ(e ;db ) quantify the tightest
(largest) approximations of ES and US(e) respectively among all
uniform distance bounds d .
Theorem 1 states thatdb is the smallest among all (uniform) distance
bounds betweenM and S, such that a safe controller synthesized
on M is also safe for S. Even though this is a stricter condition
than we need for defining ES , where we care about the existence
of at least one safe controller for S, it allows us to use any safe
controller forM as a safe controller for S. Formally, db ≤ d , for
all d ∈ R+ such that ∀e ∈ Eφ (d) ,∀u ∈ Uφ(e ;d ) , ξS(·) |= φ(e).
Intuitively, to compute (9), we collect all ξM (·), ξS(·) pairs (across
all e ∈ E and u ∈ Uφ(e)) where ξM (·) |= φ(e) and ξS(·) ̸|= φ(e). We
then evaluate (10) for each pair and take the maximum to compute
db . By expanding (contracting) everyA(·) ∈ A (R(·) ∈ R) uniformly
by db , we ensure that none of the ξM (·) collected above is feasible
once the specification is modified, and hence, ξS(·)will never falsify
φ(e). To ensure this, we prove that db is the minimum distance by
which the avoid sets should be augmented (or the reach sets should
be contracted). Thus, db can also be interpreted as the minimum
d by which the specification should be modified to ensure that
Uφ(e ;d ) ⊆ US(e) for all e ∈ E.
Corollary 1. Let d ∈ [0,db ] satisfies (11), then ξM (·) |= φ(e;d)
implies ξM (·) |= φ(e;db ).
We conclude this section by discussing the relative advantages and
limitations of SPEC and SSM, and a few remarks.
Comparing SPEC and SSM. SSM is specification-independent
(and hence environment-independent); and hence can be reused
across different tasks and environments. This is ensured by com-
puting the distance between trajectories across all input control
sequences; however, the very same aspect can make SSM overly-
conservative. Making SPEC specification-dependent trades in gen-
eralizability for a less conservativemeasure. Although environment-
dependent, the set of safe environments obtained using SPEC is
larger compared to SSM. This is an important trade-off to make
for any distance metric–the utility of a distance metric could be
somewhat limited if it is too conservative.
The computational complexities for computing SPEC and SSM
are the same since they both can be computed using Algorithm 1.
To compute SSM we sample from a domain of all finite horizon
controls. To compute SPEC we additionally need to be able to define
and sample from the set of environment scenarios, but we believe
that some representation of the environment scenarios is important
for practical applications.
Remark 1. The proposed framework can also be used in the sce-
narios where there is a deterministic controller for each environment.
In such cases, UΠ(e) (and Uφ(e)) is a singleton set for every envi-
ronment e (see Section 8.2 for an example). However, from a control
theory perspective, it might be useful to have a set of safe controllers
that have different transient behaviors, that the system designer can
choose from without recomputing the distance metric.
6 DISTANCE METRIC COMPUTATION
Since a dynamics model of S is not available, the computation
of the distance bound db is generally difficult. Interestingly, this
computational issue can be resolved using a randomized approach,
such as scenario optimization [9]. Scenario optimization has been
used for a variety of purposes [10, 11], such as robust control, model
reduction, as well as for the computation of SSM [2].
Computing db by scenario optimization is summarized in Algo-
rithm 1. We start by (randomly) extracting N realizations of the
environment ei , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N (Line 2). Each realization ei consists
of an initial state x i0, and a sequence of reach and avoid sets, A
i (t)
and Ri (t). For each ei , we extract a controller ui ∈ Uφ(ei ) (Line 5). If
such a controller does not exist, we denote ui to be a null controller
uϕ . ui (if not = uϕ ) is then applied to both the system as well as the
abstraction to obtain the corresponding trajectories ξ iS(·;x i0, ui ) and
ξ iM (·;x i0, ui ) (Line 6). We next compute the distance between these
two trajectories, di , using (10) (Line 7). If ui = uϕ , no satisfying
controller exists forM, and hence d(ξS(·;x i0, un ), ξM (·;x i0, un )) is
trivially 0. The maximum across all these distances, dˆϵ , is then used
as an estimate for db (Line 10).
Although simple in its approach, scenario optimization provides
provable approximation guarantees. In Algorithm 1, we have to
sample both an e ∈ E and a corresponding controller u ∈ Uφ(e).
We define a joint sample space
D = {(e×Uφ(e)) : e ∈ E,Uφ(e) , ∅}∪{(e, uϕ ) : e ∈ E,Uφ(e) = ∅}
(12)
D contains all feasible (e, u) pairs for M. We create a dummy
sample (e, uϕ ) for all e where a satisfying controller does not exist
for the abstraction. We next define a probability distribution on D,
p(e, u) = p(e) · p(u | e) where p(e) is probability of sampling e ∈ E
and p(u | e) is the probability of sampling u ∈ Uφ(e) given e . This
distribution is key to capture the sequential nature of sampling u
only after sampling e . For e ∈ E where Uφ(e) = ∅, p(uϕ | e) = 1
HSCC’19, April 2019, Montreal, Canada Ghosh and Bansal, et al.
since D has only a single entry for e , i.e, (e, uϕ ). In Algorithm 1, in
Line 2, we sample ei ∼ p(e). In Line 5, we sample ui ∼ p(u | ei ).
Proposition 3. LetD be the joint sample space as defined in (12),
with the probability distribution pD = p(e, u). Select a ‘violation
parameter’ ϵ ∈ (0, 1) and a ‘confidence parameter’ β ∈ (0, 1). Pick N
such that
N ≥ 2
ϵ
(
ln 1
β
+ 1
)
, (13)
then, with probability at least 1 − β , the solution dˆϵ to Algorithm 1
satisfies the following conditions:
(1) P((e, u) ∈ D : d(ξS(·;x0, u), ξM (·;x0, u)) > dˆϵ ) ≤ ϵ
(2) P
(
(e, u) ∈ D : ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e; dˆϵ ) → ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e)
)
>
1 − ϵ providedUφ(e,dˆϵ ) ⊆ Uφ(e).
The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in the Appendix. Intuitively,
Proposition 3 states that dˆϵ is a high confidence estimate of db , if a
large enough N is chosen. If we discard the confidence parameter β
for a moment, this proposition states that the size of the violation set
(the set of (e, u) ∈ D where the corresponding distance is greater
than dˆϵ ) is smaller than or equal to the prescribed ϵ value. As ϵ
tends to zero, dˆϵ approaches the desired optimal solution db . In
turn, the simulation effort grows unbounded since N is inversely
proportional to ϵ .
As for the confidence parameter β , one should note that dˆϵ is
a random quantity that depends on the randomly extracted (e, u)
pairs. It may happen that the extracted samples are not representa-
tive enough, in which case the size of the violation set will be larger
than ϵ . Parameter β controls the probability that this happens; and
the final result holds with probability 1− β . Since N in (13) depends
logarithmically on 1/β ; β can be pushed down to small values such
as 10−16, to make 1−β so close to 1 to lose any practical importance.
Finally, once we have a high confidence estimate of db , we can
use it with Proposition 2 to provide guarantees on the safety of a
controller for the system, provided that it is safe for the abstraction.
(Statement (2) in Proposition 3)
Note that the controller ui is extracted randomly from the set
Uφ(ei ) (Line 5). ObtainingUφ(ei ) and randomly sampling from it
can be challenging in itself depending on the control scheme, Π, and
the specification, φ(ei ). However, one way to randomly extract ui is
using rejection sampling, i.e., we randomly sample controllers from
the setUΠ until we find a controller that satisfies the specification
for the model. Since the controller performance is evaluated only
on the model during this process, it is often cheap and does not put
the system at risk. Nevertheless, choosing a good control scheme
makes this process more efficient, as the number of samples rejected
before a feasible controller is found will be fewer (see Section 7 for
further discussion on this). Rejection sampling, however, poses a
problem when Uφ(ei ) = ∅ and there is no way of knowing that
beforehand. In such cases, one can impose a limit on the number
of rejected samples to make sure the algorithm terminates. This
problem can also be overcome easily when there is a single safe
controller for each environment, i.e.,Uφ(ei ) is a singleton set (see
Remark 1).
Remark 2. Even though we have presented scenario optimization
to estimate db , alternative derivative free optimization approaches
Algorithm 1: Scenario optimization for estimating SPEC
1 set dˆϵ = 0
2 extract N realizations of the environment ei , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N
3 for i = 0 : N − 1 do
4 if Uφ(ei ) , ∅ then
5 extract a realization of a feasible controller
ui ∈ Uφ(ei )
6 run the controller ui on S andM, and obtain ξ iS(·)
and ξ iM (·)
7 compute di = d(ξ iS(·), ξ iM (·))
8 else
9 ui = uϕ and di = 0
10 set dˆϵ = maxi ∈{1,2, ...,N } di
such as Bayesian optimization, simulated annealing, evolutionary
algorithms, and covariance matrix adaptation can be used as well.
However, for many of these algorithms, it might be challenging to
provide formal guarantees on the quality of the resultant estimate of
the distance bound.
Algorithm 1 samples N environment scenarios and correspond-
ing controllers prior to running any executions onM and S. Imag-
ine at iteration i , we have di > 0; and if at iteration (i+1), di+1 < di ,
then the (i + 1)th sample is not informative for approximating db .
A simple way to overcome this issue would be to consider only
Uφ(ei ;di ) as the set of feasible controllers at the (i + 1)th iteration;
i.e., consider controllers where ξM (·) |= φ(ei ;di ). This variant of
Algorithm 1 would reduce the number of executions of the sys-
tem; and ensure that each execution is informative for estimating
db . To implement this scheme, we would maintain a running max
db(i) which contains the maximum of di seen till now. In iteration
(i + 1), instead of sampling fromUφ(e) in Line 5, we sample from
Uφ(e,db(i )). Further, before the end of loop, in Line 7, we update
db(i+1) = max(db(i),di+1).
7 RUNNING EXAMPLE: DISTANCE
COMPUTATION
We now apply the proposed algorithm to compute db for the setting
described in Section 4.Uφ(e) in this case is given as
Uφ(e) ={u ∈ UΠ(e) : ∥ξM (H ;x0, u) − x∗∥2 < γ },
whereUΠ(e) is the set of LQR controllers (see Section 4). To illus-
trate the importance of the choice of distance metric, we compute
two different distance metrics between S and M: da in (7) and
db in (9). To compute db , we use Algorithm 1. To compute da , we
modify Algorithm 1 to sample a random controller fromUΠ(e) in
Line 5 and compute di using (7) in Line 7.
According to the scenario approach with ϵ = 0.01 and β = 10−6,
we extractN = 2964 different reach-avoid scenarios (i.e.,N different
final states to reach). For each ei , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2964}, we obtain
a feasible LQR controller ui ∈ Uφ(ei ) using rejection sampling.
In particular, we randomly sample a penalty parameter q, solve
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the corresponding Riccati equation to obtain LQR(q), and apply it
onM. If the corresponding ξM (·) satisfies φ(ei ), we use ui as our
feasible controller sample; otherwise, we sample a new q and repeat
the procedure until a feasible controller is found. This procedure
tends to be really fast and requires simulating onlyM. A feasible
controller was found within 3 samples of q for all ei in this case.
For da , we randomly sample a penalty parameter q and use LQR(q)
as the controller.
The obtained distance metrics are da = 0.43,db = 0. Since
da < γ , it can be used to synthesize a safe controller for S; however,
we can synthesize controller only for those reach-avoid scenarios
whereM satisfies a much stringent specification: ξM must reach
within a ball of radius 0.07 around the target state. Consequently,
the set Eφ (da ) is likely to be very small. In contrast, db = 0; thus,
Proposition 3 ensures that any controller designed onM that sat-
isfies φ(e) is guaranteed to satisfy it for S as well. In particular,
the dynamics of S andM are same for the state x1, and state x2 is
uncontrollable for S and remain 0 at all times. Thus, any controller
that reaches within a ball of radius γ around a desired state x∗1
forM, if applied on S, also ensures that the system state reaches
within the same ball. Even though this relationship between S and
M is unknown, db is able to capture it only through simulations
of S. This example also illustrates that db significantly reduces the
conservativeness in SSM, and does not unnecessarily contract the
set of safe environments.
8 CASE STUDIES
We now demonstrate how SPEC can be used to obtain the safe
set of environments and controllers for an autonomous quadrotor
and an autonomous car. In Section 8.1, we demonstrate how SPEC
provides much larger safe sets compared to SSM. In Section 8.2, we
demonstrate how SPEC not only captures the differences between
the dynamics of S andM, but also other aspects of the system, in
particular the sensor error, that might affect the satisfiability of a
specification.
8.1 Safe Altitude Control for Quadrotor
Our first example illustrates how the proposed distance metric
behaves when the only difference between the system and the
abstraction is the value of one parameter. However, unlike the
running example, the system and the abstraction dynamics are
non-linear. Moreover, we illustrate how SPEC can be used in the
cases where all safe controllers forM may not be safe for S.
We use the reach-avoid setting described in [15], where the
authors are interested in controlling the altitude of a quadrotor in
an indoor setting while ensuring that it does not go too close to the
ceiling or the floor, which are obstacles in our experiments.
A dynamic model of quadrotor vertical flight can be written as:
z(t + 1) =z(t) +Tvz (t)
vz (t + 1) =vz (t) +T (ku(t) + д), (14)
where z is the vehicle’s altitude, vz is its vertical velocity and u
is the commanded average thrust. The gravitational acceleration
is д = −9.8m/s2 and the discretization step T is 0.01. The control
input u(t) is bounded to [0, 1]. We are interested in designing a
controller for S that ensures safety over a horizon of 100 timesteps.
In particular, we have X0 = {(z,vz ) : 0.5 ≤ z ≤ 2.5∧−3 ≤ vz ≤ 4},
A = {A(·)}, and R = R2. The avoid set at any time t is given as
A(t) = {(z,vz ) ∈ R2 : 0.5m ≤ z(t) ≤ 2.5m}. We again assume that
the dynamics in (14) are unknown. Consider an abstraction of S
with same dynamics as (14) except that the value of parameter k in
the abstraction dynamics, kM , is different.
The space of controllersUΠ(e) is given by all possible control
sequences over the time horizon (i.e.,UΠ(e) = U.) For computing
Uφ(e), we use the Level Set Toolbox [30] that gives us both the set
of initial states from which there exist a controller that will keep the
ξM (·) outside the avoid set at all times (also called the reachable set),
as well as the corresponding least restrictive controller. In particular,
we can apply any control when the abstraction trajectory is inside
the reachable set and the safety-preserving control (given by the
toolbox) when the trajectory is near the boundary of the reachable
set. For computation of the distance bounds, we sample a random
controller sequence according to this safety-preserving control law.
If any initial state lies outside the reachable set, then it is also
guaranteed thatUφ(e) = ∅ so we do not need to do any rejection
sampling in this case.
When kM < k ,M has strictly less control authority compared
to S. Thus, any controller that satisfies the specification for M
will also satisfy the specification for S, so Eφ (0) itself is an under
approximation of ES . SPEC is again able to capture this behavior.
Indeed, we computed an estimate for the distance bound using
Algorithm 1 and the obtained numbers are da = 0.30 and db = 0.
Note that not only is da conservative, it may not be particularly
useful in synthesizing a safe controller forS. da computed using Al-
gorithm 1 ensures that a safe controller designed onM for φ(e ;da )
is also safe for S with high probability, only when this controller is
randomly selected from the setUΠ . However, a random controller
selected from UΠ is unlikely to satisfy φ(e;da ) forM itself, and
thus nothing can be said about S either. Thus, it is hard to actually
compute an approximation of ES . In contrast, db samples a con-
troller from the setUφ(e) in Algorithm 1. Therefore, to synthesize
a controller, we randomly select a controller from the setUφ(e ;db ),
which is guaranteed to be safe on bothM and S with high proba-
bility. Therefore, it might be better to compare db to da2, which is
defined similar to da , except the inner maximum in (7) is computed
overUφ(e) instead. da2 in this case turns out to be 0.5.
Note that if we could instead compute the distance metrics ex-
actly, da2 ≤ da , since Uφ(e) ⊂ UΠ . However, random sampling
based estimate of da2 can be greater than that of da if the con-
trollers corresponding to a large distance between the ξS(·) and
ξM (·) are sparse inUΠ compared to that inUφ(e).
For illustration purposes, we also compute the reachable set
Eφ (db ), by augmenting the avoid set by db and recomputing the
reachable sets using the Level Set Toolbox. As shown in Figure
2, Eφ (0) (the area withing the blue contour) is indeed contained
within ES (the area within the red contour). Here, ES has been
computed using the system dynamics. Even though Eφ (da2) (the
area within the magenta contour) is also contained in ES , it is
significantly smaller in size compared to Eφ (db ).
When kM > k , S has strictly less control authority compared to
M. Consequently, there might exist some environments for which
it is possible to synthesize a safe controller for M, but the same
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Figure 2. Different reachable sets when the quadrotor abstraction is conser-
vative. The distance metric db only considers the distance between trajecto-
ries that violates the specification on the system and satisfies it on the ab-
straction, leading to a less conservative estimate of the distance, and a better
approximation of ES .
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Figure 3. Different reachable sets when the quadrotor abstraction is overly
optimistic. The distance metric db achieves a far less conservative under-
approximation of ES compared to the other distance metrics.
controller when deployed on S might lead to an unsafe behavior.
We again compute the distance bounds using Algorithm 1 and
the obtained numbers are da = 0.30,da2 = 0.49,db = 0.1. The
corresponding reachable sets are shown in Figure 3. Even though
we start with an overly optimistic abstraction, both da2 and db are
able to compute an under approximation of ES ; however, the set
estimated by da2 is, once again, overly conservative.
8.2 Webots: Lane Keeping
We now show the application of the proposed metric for designing
a safe lane keeping controller for an autonomous car.
In this example, we use the Webots simulator [39]. The car
model within the simulator is our S. For the abstraction M we
consider the bicycle model,
Ûx = v · sinθ
Ûy = v · cosθ
Ûv = a
Ûθ = v
l
tanω
(15)
where [x ,y,v,θ ] is the state, representing perpendicular deviation
from the center of the lane, position along the road, speed, and
heading respectively. The maximum speed is limited to vmax =
10 km/hr. We have two inputs, (1) a discrete acceleration con-
trol a = {−a¯, 0, a¯}; and (2) a continuous steering control ω ∈
[−π/4,π/4]rad/s . For our experiments, we use H = 200, which
translates to about 6 seconds of simulated trajectory. The dynamics
of S are typically much more complex than M and include the
physical effects like friction and slip on the road.
In this case, X0 = {(x0,θ0) : ∥x ∥ ≤ 0.2m ∧ ∥θ ∥ ≤ π/4rad}; the
initial y0 and v0 is set to zero. R(t) = {[x(t),y(t),v(t),θ (t)] ∈ R4 :
∥x(t)∥ ≤ 0.5m}∀t ∈ T . The reach set corresponds to keeping the
car within the 0.5m of the center of the lane. For keeping the car in
the lane, the car is equipped with two sensors, a camera (to capture
the lane ahead) and compass (to measure the heading of the car).
There is an on board perception module, which first captures the
image of the road ahead; and processes it to detect the lane edges
and provide an estimate of the deviation of the car from the center
of the lane.
There is another car (referred to as the environment car hereon)
driving in the front of S, which might obstruct the lane and cause
the perception module to incorrectly detect the lane center. For
each e ∈ E, the set of possible initial states of the environment
car is given by P = {(xe ,ye ) : ∥xe − x0∥ ≤ 2.0m ∧ 6.25m ≤
ye − y0 ≤ 8m}. We set the initial speed ve and heading θe of the
environment car to vmax and 0 respectively. We want to make sure
that S remains within the lane despite all possible initial positions
of the environment car. For this purpose, we compute the worst-
case db across all p ∈ P.
If the environment car or its shadow covers the lane edges (see
Figure 5 for some possible scenarios), then the lane detection fails.
Technically speaking, if such a scenario occurs, then S should
slow down and come to stop until the image processing starts
detecting the lane again. Consequently, our control scheme UΠ ,
is a hybrid controller shown in Figure 4, where in each mode the
controller is given by an LQR controller (with a fixed Q and R
matrix) corresponding to the (linearized) dynamics in that mode. In
this example, our controller is a deterministic controller since the Q
and R matrices are fixed, and hence |UΠ | = 1. In Figure 4, in mode
(1), the lane is detected and v(t) < vmax . When the v(t) = vmax
we transition to mode (2) given the lane is still detected. When the
lane is no longer detected, we transition to mode (3) if v(t) > 0, or
mode (4) if v(t) = 0. In modes (3) and (4), the car slows down until
the lane is detected again.
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Figure 4. Hybrid controller for lane keeping. lane means a lane is detected
by the perception system. The dashed line represents the transitions taken
on initialization based on the value of lane. To closely follow the center of
the lane, we synthesize a LQR controller in each mode.
(a) Environment car covers left lane.
(b) Shadow of environment car covers left lane.
(c) Lane detected correctly.
Figure 5. The lane detection fails for (a) and (b) and S car tries to slow down.
When lane is correctly detected (c), the LQR controller tries to follow the lane
By setting ϵ = 0.01 and β = 1e − 6 we get N ≥ 2964. We used Al-
gorithm 1, to sample N different initial states of theS, (x0,θ0) ∈ X0;
and environment car in the simulator, p ∈ P. Since the controller
is deterministic, the set of feasible controllers is a singleton set,
and hence we do not need to sample a feasible controller (Line 5 in
Algorithm 1). Among these environment scenarios, the controller
Figure 6. The green lines represent the boundaries of the original reach set.
The yellow region is the contracted reach set for the model computed using
dˆϵ . The model’s trajectory shown in blue is entirely contained within the yel-
low region. Consequently, the system’s trajectory (shown in dotted red) leaves
the yellow region but is contained within the original reach set at all times.
onM is also able to safely control S for 2519 scenarios. dˆϵ is de-
termined entirely by the remaining 445 controller, and computed
to be 0.34m. We show the application of the the computed dˆϵ for a
sample environment scenario in Figure 6. The green lines represent
the original reach set. The yellow shaded region represents the
contracted reach set for the model computed using dˆϵ . The model’s
trajectory (shown in blue) is contained in the yellow region and
hence satisfies the more constrained specification. As a result, even
though the system’s trajectory (shown in dotted red) leaves the
yellow region, it is contained within the original reach set at all
times.
We also analyze these 445 environmental scenarios that con-
tribute to dˆϵ , and notice that the fault lies within the perception
module. In Figure 7, we show one such scenario. In this case,
θ0 = −π/4. Because of the left rotation of the car, the rightmost
lane appears smaller and farther due to the perspective distortion.
Furthermore, the presence of the environment car completely cover
the rightmost lane in the image. The image processing module now
detects the leftmost lane as the center lane and the center lane as
the rightmost lane. Consequently, the module returns an inaccurate
estimation of the center of the lane, causing S to go outside the
center lane. This example illustrates that the samples in Algorithm
1 that contributed to dˆϵ could also be used to analyze the reasons
behind the violation of the safety specification by S.
9 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Determining safe environments and synthesizing safe controllers
for autonomous systems is an important problem. Typically, we
rely on an abstraction of the system to synthesize controllers in
different environments. However, when a mathematical model of
the system is not available, for example when the abstraction is
obtained through data, it becomes challenging to provide safety
guarantees for the system based on the abstraction. In this paper,
we propose a specification-centric simulation metric SPEC that
can be used to determine the set of safe environments; and to
synthesize a safe controller using such data-driven abstractions. We
also present an algorithm to compute this metric using executions
on the system without knowing its true dynamics. The proposed
HSCC’19, April 2019, Montreal, Canada Ghosh and Bansal, et al.
Figure 7. An example of the environment scenario that contributes to the
distance between the model and the system. The environment samples used
for computing SPEC can be used to identify the reasons behind the violation
of the safety specification by the system.
metric is less conservative and allows controller synthesis for reach-
avoid specifications over a broader range of environments compared
to the standard simulation metric.
In future, it would be interesting to extend the proposed frame-
work for more general specifications and study its application in
runtime-assurance frameworks like [22] and [13]. Another inter-
esting direction will be to explore active sampling methods, such
as Bayesian Optimization, for the computation of SPEC.
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10 APPENDIX
10.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let us consider for a given environment e ∈ E and control
u ∈ UΠ(e), ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e;da ). We would like to prove that
ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e).
From (7), we have
∥ξS(t) − ξM (t)∥ ≤ da ∀t ∈ T . (16)
From the definition of specification in (8), we have ξM (·) |= φ(e ;da )
if and only if ξM (·) ∈ φ(e;da ). Therefore, ξM (t) < A(t) ⊕ da and
ξM (t) ∈ R(t) ⊖ da ∀t ∈ T . Since ξM (t) < A(t) ⊕ da ,
∥ξM (t) − a∥ > da ,∀t ∈ T ,∀a ∈ A(t). (17)
Combining (16) and (17) implies that
∥ξS(t) − a∥ > 0 ,∀t ∈ T ,∀a ∈ A(t). (18)
Equation (18) implies that ξS(t) < A(t) for any t ∈ T . Similarly, it
can be shown that
∥ξS(t) − r ∥ > 0 ,∀t ∈ T ,∀r ∈ R(t)c ,
where R(t)c denotes the complement of the set R(t). Therefore,
ξS(t) ∈ R(t) ∀t ∈ T .
Since ξS(t) < A(t) and ξS(t) ∈ R(t) for all t ∈ T , we have
ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e). □
10.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof.We prove the desired result by contradiction. Suppose there
exists an environment e ∈ E and a controller u ∈ Uφ(e,db ) such
that ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e;db ) but ξS(·;x0, u) ̸|= φ(e).
Since ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e;db ), we have that,
∀t ∈ T ξM (t ;x0, u) < A(t ;db ) = A(t) ⊕ db (19)
∀t ∈ T ξM (t ;x0, u) ∈ R(t ;db ) = R(t) ⊖ db (20)
Since db is the solution to (9), and u ∈ Uφ(e) (asUφ(e ;db ) ⊆ Uφ(e))
is such that ξM (·) ̸|= φ(e), (9) and (10) imply that,
min
t ∈T
(
min{h (ξM (t),A(t)) ,−h (ξM (t),R(t))}) ≤ db . (21)
Therefore, ∃t ′ ∈ T such that
min{h (ξM (t ′),A(t ′)) ,−h (ξM (t ′),R(t ′))} ≤ db , (22)
which implies that either
(1) h
(
ξM (t ′),A(t ′)
) ≤ db , or
(2) h
(
ξM (t ′),R(t ′)
) ≥ −db
If h
(
ξM (t ′),A(t ′)
) ≤ db , ∃a ∈ A(t ′) such that
∥ξM (t ′) − a∥ ≤ db .
Therefore, ξM (t ′) ∈ A(t ′) ⊕ db , which contradicts (19). Similarly,
if h
(
ξM (t ′),R(t ′)
) ≥ −db , ∃r ∈ R(t ′)c such that
∥ξM (t ′) − r ∥ ≤ db ,
which implies that ξM (t ′) < R(t ′) ⊖ db , which contradicts (20).
When Uφ(e,db ) ⊈ Uφ(e), for any controller u ∈ Uφ(e,db ) \
Uφ(e) such that ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e ;db ), we can no longer comment
on the behavior of the corresponding system trajectory. This is
because while computing db , these controllers were not taken into
account. □
10.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Statement (1) of Proposition 3 follows directly from the
guarantees provided by Scenario Optimization (Theorem 1 in [11]).
To use the result in [11], we need to prove: (a) computing db can
be converted into a standard Scenario Optimization problem and
(b) Algorithm 1 samples i.i.d from D with probability pD .
(9) can be re-written as db = max(e,u)∈D d(ξS(·), ξM (·)) which
can be formalized as the following optimization problem,
min д
s.t. ∀(e, u) ∈ D ,d(ξS(·), ξM (·)) ≤ д
This is semi-infinite optimization problem where the constraints
are convex (in fact, linear) in the optimization variable д for any
given (e, u). Statement (1) now follows from Theorem 1 in [11]
by replacing c = 1, γ by д, ∆ by D, and f by d(ξS(·), ξM (·)) − д.
Theorem 1 in [11], however, requires that i.i.d samples are chosen
from the distribution pD . This can be proved by noticing that, in
Algorithm 1, we first sample ei ∼ p(e) (in Line 2), and then sample
ui ∼ p(u | e) (in Line 4.) Hence, every (ei , ui ) is sampled from
pD = p(e) · p(u | e). Since each i = 1, . . . ,N is sampled randomly
and independent of each other, the (ei , ui ) pairs are indeed sampled
i.i.d from pD .
Algorithm 1 returns an estimate dˆϵ for db . We have already
established that dˆϵ satisfies the probabilistic guarantees provided by
scenario optimization (Statement (1)). From Proposition 2, we have
∀(e, u) ∈ D where d(ξS(·), ξM (·)) ≤ dˆϵ , ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e ; dˆϵ ) →
ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e), providedUφ(e ;dˆϵ ) ⊆ Uφ(e). Therefore,
P
(
(e, u) ∈ D : ξM (·;x0, u) |= φ(e; dˆϵ ) → ξS(·;x0, u) |= φ(e)
)
> 1−ϵ .
□
10.4 Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
Proof. Consider any d > db . From the statement of Theorem 1,
we have that Uφ(e ;d ) ⊆ Uφ(e ;db ). Hence, Eφ (d) ⊆ Eφ (db ) fol-
lows from the definition of Eφ (d) in (6). Uφ(e ;db ) ⊆ US(e) and
Eφ (db ) ⊆ ES is already ensured by Proposition 2, and hence The-
orem 1 follows.
We now prove that for all 0 < d < db , ∃ e ∈ E such that (11)
does not hold, and hence the result of Theorem 1 trivially holds.
We prove the result by contradiction. Suppose 0 < d < db be
such that (11) holds. Let (e∗, u∗) be the environment, controller pair
where d(ξM (·;x∗0 , u∗), ξS(·;x∗0 , u∗)) = db . Equation (9) and (10)
thus imply that
min
t ∈T
(
min{h (ξM (t ;x∗0 , u∗),A∗(t)) ,−h (ξM (t ;x∗0 , u∗),R∗(t))}) = db ,
(23)
and ξS(·;x∗0 , u∗) ̸|= φ(e∗). Equation (23) implies that
∀t ∈ T , h (ξM (t ;x∗0 , u∗),A∗(t)) ≥ db (24)
∀t ∈ T , h (ξM (t ;x∗0 , u∗),R∗(t)) ≤ −db . (25)
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Equations (24) and (25) imply that
∀t ∈ T , ξM (t ;x∗0 , u∗) < A∗(t) ⊕ d, ξM (t ;x∗0 , u∗) ∈ R∗(t) ⊖ d . (26)
Consequently, we have ξM (·;x∗0 , u∗) |= φ(e∗;d). This contradicts (11)
since ξS(·;x∗0 , u∗) ̸|= φ(e∗). Therefore, for all 0 < d < db , ∃ e ∈E , u ∈ UΠ(e) , ξM (·) |= φ(e;d)↛ ξS(·) |= φ(e).
To prove the corollary, we first prove that if d1 > d2, then
ξM (·) |= φ(e;d1) implies ξM (·) |= φ(e;d2) ,∀e ∈ E. Since ξM (·) |=
φ(e;d1), we have
∀t ∈ T , ξM (t) < A(t) ⊕ d1, ξM (t) ∈ R(t) ⊖ d1
Since d1 > d2, the above equation implies that
∀t ∈ T , ξM (t) < A(t) ⊕ d2, ξM (t) ∈ R(t) ⊖ d2.
Therefore, ξM (·) |= φ(e ;d2). The corollary now follows from noting
that for all 0 < d < db , ∃ e ∈ E , u ∈ UΠ(e) , ξM (·) |= φ(e;d) ↛
ξS(·) |= φ(e). □
